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This paper examines the extent to which economic crises facilitate the development of 
more effective regional institutions and whether such institutions can shield regions from 
crises. It compares six regional economic crises over the last four decades and the 
institution building—or decay—that followed. The analysis concludes that five conditions 
are especially important in generating a constructive regional response: (i) a significant 
degree of regional economic interdependence; (ii) an independent secretariat or 
intergovernmental body charged with cooperation; (iii) webs of interlocking economic 
agreements; and, as elements of the multilateral context, (iv) conflict with the relevant 
international organization (such as the International Monetary Fund [IMF]); and (v) the 
support of the United States. The paper then reviews three episodes of crises in Europe, 
concluding that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has deflected balance of 
payments and currency crises but not crises of other types, such as sovereign debt 
crises. Asian regionalism would be well served by heads of government taking the lead 
and delegating tasks to intergovernmental networks and secretariats, central banks and 
finance ministries retaining substantial collective autonomy in their fields of 
responsibility, and the use of concentric circles to accommodate countries with different 
levels of commitment to regionalism.  
 
 
Keywords:  Economic crises; financial crises; regional institutions; Asian regionalism; 
regional integration 
 




Regionalist movements are intimately connected to economic and financial crises. Most 
of the financial crises of the last four decades have had a strong regional dimension. We 
identify them as the Latin American debt crisis, the European currency crisis, or the 
Asian financial crisis because their impact has been geographically concentrated. Crises 
call into question the adequacy of multilateral arrangements for prevention and 
stabilization and, under certain circumstances, galvanize support for proposals to 
strengthen regional agreements and institutions. Once in place, regional arrangements 
can in principle shield countries against the adverse effects of global financial 
turbulence, if they are well designed; but the recent banking and sovereign debt crises in 
Europe demonstrate that satisfying this proviso is difficult.  
 
Several authors have examined the link between crises and regional institution building. 
Most treatments to date have addressed specific crises in isolation and have asked 
different questions of different cases, however. Our understanding of regionalism would 
benefit from more systematic treatment of the relationship between them. The mandate 
of this paper is to survey the existing literature for what we know about the connections 
between economic crises and regional institution-building specifically. The paper thus 
addresses the two-way relationship: 
 
(i) the extent to which economic crises help or hinder the development of more 
effective regional institutions, and 
 
(ii) the extent to which regional institutions can be designed in ways to help guard 
against or mitigate future economic crises. 
 
This paper will also supplement the literature with available empirical material on crisis 
cases, present some of the author’s own arguments, and draw out the insights for Asia. 
Specifically, this paper seeks to address the implications for policies and institutional 
design in the Asian region. 
 
The study examines previous cases of crises and their impact on regional institutions, 
employing three methods. First, it conducts an inventory of these crises and the analysis 
and conclusions about them. Second, to the extent feasible, the paper conducts a 
structured comparison of the cases. By asking similar questions in each crisis case, 
relating variables of interest to institutional outcomes, we can draw generalizations about 
the conditions that are either conducive or adverse to institutional building. Third, the 
paper will elaborate on aspects of cases that speak to key points in the present Asian 
discourse on regionalism and institutions. The case treatments, while considering a 
common set of factors, will thus deviate somewhat from a common template.  
 
One particular caveat is in order: the research design is constrained by the relatively 
limited number of region-wide crises over the last four decades. Rather than select 
cases with particular settings on the variables, we must work with the cases that we 
have, drawing conclusions where doing so is valid, and acknowledging where 
hypotheses remain open. (On the other hand, this study avoids the trap of selecting on2          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 81 
 
 
the dependent variable and considers regions and episodes characterized both by 
institution building and institutional decay.)  
 
After comparing these crises, the paper concludes that five conditions are especially 
important in facilitating a constructive regional response to a crisis: (i) a significant 
degree of regional economic interdependence (market integration), (ii) an independent 
secretariat or intergovernmental body charged with cooperation, (iii) webs of interlocking 
economic agreements, and, as elements of the multilateral context, (iv) conflict with the 
relevant international organization (such as the International Monetary Fund [IMF]), and 
(v) the blessing of the United States (US) for regional integration. Asian regionalism 
would be well served, the paper recommends, by the heads of government taking the 
lead and delegating tasks to intergovernmental networks and secretariats. Within their 
mandate, central bank and finance ministry officials should have substantial autonomy in 
order to preserve the confidence of markets.  
 
Note that some matters lie beyond the scope of this paper. First, this treatment focuses 
specifically on economic, monetary, and financial crises. Crises in health, environment, 
foreign policy, and natural disasters are beyond this scope. Second, it considers only 
region-wide cases in the modern era of increasing capital mobility, not crises prior to 
1970. Third, an early outline of this paper considered the division of labor among 
regional and multilateral institutions—that is, what functions are best handled at which 
levels. Although this is a very important topic, this too must be reserved for treatment 
elsewhere owing to limited space here.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the nature and definitions 
of crisis and institutions, which are both central concepts in this study. The third section 
addresses the causal links between crises and institution building as well as the factors 
that condition regional responses to crises.  The fourth section presents six crisis cases 
and draws conclusions from their comparison. The fifth examines how regional 
institutions form defenses against crises. On the basis of these findings, the final section 
offers several recommendations for the design of Asian institutions. 
 
 
2.   Concepts and Definitions 
 
As the concept of crisis distinguishes this paper from others in the project, it bears some 
elaboration and clarification. The Oxford English Dictionary’s first definition is “a time of 
intense difficulty or danger.” The word derives from the Greek “krisis,” meaning decision, 
and “krinein,” meaning decide. Original usage in English thus meant a time of decision 
and has evolved toward an emergency requiring decision. The concept is employed 
widely, though inconsistently, in comparative politics, international relations, and political 
science (see, for example, Graham Allison’s analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Allison 
and Zelikow 1999, as well as Phillips and Rimkunas 1978, Svensson 1986, Goertz 
2006). This is consistent with our current usage with respect to economics and finance: 
an economic or financial emergency that requires a rapid policy response.  
 
In practice, this label applies to major declines in the value of national currencies and 
financial assets, the bankruptcy of financial institutions, collapse of financial markets, Economic Crises and Institutions for Regional Economic Cooperation  |       3 
 
and macroeconomic recessions or depressions. The Latin American debt crisis of the 
1980s, European exchange rate crisis of 1992/93, Mexican peso crisis of 1994/95, and 
Asian financial crisis of 1997/98 fall under this definition. Also falling under this definition 
will be major shifts in currency values and conflicts over payments balances and 
macroeconomic adjustment, such as the “Nixon shock” of 1971, as well as major shifts 
in commodity prices and supply, such as the “oil shocks” of the last 4 decades. Each of 
these events forced decisions by the governments with ramifications for international 
cooperation, sometimes on a regional basis and sometimes not. 
 
Gourevitch expands on the importance of focusing on crises in comparative political 
economy. “In prosperous times,” he writes, “[s]ocial systems appear stable, and the 
economy works with sufficient regularity that its rules can be modeled as if they 
functioned without social referent.” In difficult economic times, by contrast, “[p]atterns 
unravel, economic models come into conflict, and policy prescriptions diverge. . . .” 
“Crisis opened [sic] the system of relationships, making politics and policy more fluid.” 
Societal groups divide and recombine, producing political realignment. “The moments of 
greatest freedom are crisis points.” (Gourevitch 1983; quotations appear on pp. 17, 32, 
22, and 240, respectively). So it is with the political economy of regionalism as well. 
 
In the literature on regional institutions, Calder and Ye (2004) develop the concept of 
“critical juncture,” which is similar to the concept of crisis. Drawing on Joseph Nye’s early 
work on regional integration, they specify a critical juncture as an historical episode 
characterized by crisis, time pressure, and stimulus for collective action to a common 
problem. Nye (1965) had highlighted the importance of a “catalyst,” which often takes 
the form of an external shock leading to discontinuities in institution building. For our 
present purposes, however, it is important to separate the definition of crisis from the 
effect of institutional change. This paper investigates when and why some crises 
generate institutional change while others do not. If an event must produce institutional 
change in order to qualify as a crisis, our analysis would be circular.  
 
The papers in this project examine a variety of types of critical junctures in their analyses 
of regionalism. Kevin O’Rourke, for example, examines key turning points in postwar 
European history to explain the establishment of supranational regional institutions 
during the 1950s and the accession of the United Kingdom and most of the remaining 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries to the European Community. These 
turning points, a confluence of fundamental and almost coincidental conditions, differ 
from crises, which are defined here in relatively narrow economic and financial terms. 
His and several other papers serve to remind that institutions can arise from 
circumstances completely unrelated to crises.   
 
Crises are characterized by phases. First, crises are preceded by periods of normality, 
an equilibrium during which economies and the political relationships among actors and 
institutions are relatively stable. Tranquility nonetheless masks the gradual buildup of 
debt, for example, that ultimately becomes unsustainable. Second, the acute phase is 
initiated by a spark that triggers a cascading series of events, such as a collapse in 
financial markets. Third, policymakers struggle to respond, during which time they might 
broker or be subject to realignments in international and domestic politics. Fourth, the 
crisis is resolved and the political economy returns to a new and usually different 4          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 81 
 
 
equilibrium—until the next crisis occurs. This formulation compares with Gourevitch’s 
(1983) staging of crises, and Frieden’s (1991) stylized evolution of crisis politics. 
Construction of regional institutions could occur during the response phase or in the new 
equilibrium. 
 
Consider now the concept of institutions somewhat more carefully. The notion is defined 
differently across the various subfields of political science and economics.
1 The definition 
chosen for this paper, guided by the overall purpose of the project, is broad but not all 
encompassing. The term institution is employed here to include both (i) explicit, formal 
commitments and organizations; and (ii) common processes and informal networks 
among governments that facilitate cooperation. The term can thus refer to ASEAN+3, 
the Chiang Mai Initiative, and the Economic and Monetary Union, as well as regular 
official meetings, peer review, and surveillance processes. The concept is broader than 
simply a formal regional bureaucracy, but not so broad as to include norms and 
expectations. Nor does the term include private-sector networks and transnational 
political and technocratic alliances. 
 
 
3.   How Crises Help Build Regional Institutions 
 
Consider next the reasons we might expect crises to stimulate national governments to 
construct regional institutions and the background conditions that explain why some 





                                                 
1  The political economy of international regimes struck a broad and widely used definition of “regime” that 
has sometimes been used synonymously with the term “institution.”  Regimes are “sets of implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors’ expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations”  (Krasner 1983, 1).  Goldstein, Kahler, Keohane, and 
Slaughter (2000, 387) define international institutions as “enduring sets of rules, norms, and decision-
making procedures that shape the expectations, interests, and behavior of actors.” 
a.  The project on the Rational Design of International Institutions defines them somewhat more 
narrowly as “explicit arrangements, negotiated among international actors, that prescribe, 
proscribe, and/or authorize behavior” (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001; 762).  As such they 
have five key dimensions:  membership rules, scope of issues covered, centralization of tasks, 
rules for controlling the institution, and flexibility of arrangements. 
b.  Another meaning, advanced by Milner (1998, 761) is “the means by which the diverse 
preferences of individuals are aggregated into choices or outcomes for the collective.   
Institutions here both shape and reflect the strategic interaction among agents.”  They are 
mechanisms to aggregate preferences (of individuals or states) and to exercise collective 
choice.  See also Eichengreen (1996, 1998). 
c. Institutionalization  is  distinct from, but related to, “legalization.”  Legalization in its hard form 
refers to a particular variation of institutionalization.  Hard legalization entails (i) binding rules of 
obligation, (ii) precision in those rules, and (iii) delegation to a third party of the interpretation, 
monitoring and implementation of those rules, dispute settlement, as well as perhaps the 
promulgation of further rules (Goldstein et al. 2000, 387; Abbott and Snidal 2000). The 
European Union is often cited as a case of relatively hard legalization (Alter 2000), NAFTA as a 
case of hardening legalization (Abbott 2000), while cooperation in the Asia–Pacific is described 
as non-legal (Kahler 2000b). Economic Crises and Institutions for Regional Economic Cooperation  |       5 
 
3.1. Causal  Links 
 
If crises are exceptional moments of political realignment and policy shift that can be 
institutionalized in bargains and arrangements that define a new, durable equilibrium, 
what, precisely, are the mechanisms of the change with respect to regional institutions? 
In principle, we can posit several causal channels. 
 
1.  Political demand. Crises give rise to demands for state action to protect 
corporations, banks, private sector groups, and social groups from economic 
dislocation. These demands operate through domestic politics, but satisfying them 
is sometimes more effective when coordinated regionally, which regional 
institutions facilitate. 
 
2.  Preference clarification. Crises create new information about the preferences 
and behavior of regional partners and extra-regional governments. By forcing 
choices upon governments, crises place their preferences in stark relief. Whereas 
national preferences between unilateral, regional, or multilateral arrangements 
might have been ambiguous in periods of tranquility, crises can reveal true 
allegiances “when the chips are down.”   
 
3.  Preference convergence. Crises can affect states within regions similarly, 
creating a common interest in a common response. (They can also affect 
countries within a region quite differently, such as between creditors and debtors, 
in which case they can create conflicting interests and preferences regarding the 
solution.) 
 
4.  Interest re-shuffling. Crises can change the material basis for domestic and 
intra-regional coalitions. Destruction of wealth and shifts in competitiveness 
empowers some firms and sectors and disempowers others. When these shifts 
motivate or empower transregional groups, they promote cooperation. 
 
5.  Political realignment and regime transformation. Crises can stimulate the 
realignment of domestic social groups (Gourevitch 1983) and transform domestic 
political regimes. Sometimes, such changes can make governments more 
predisposed to trading off national autonomy for the benefits of regional 
cooperation. Crises sometimes stimulate transitions to democracy (Haggard 2000) 
and democracies might be more inclined to international cooperation. 
 
6.  Network reinforcement. Crises stimulate communication, discourse, and 
negotiation among government officials and international civil servants within a 
region, reinforcing elite intergovernmental networks that can support regional 
integration in a subsequent stage (Calder and Ye 2010). 
 
7.  Leader agency. Whereas in normal circumstances, heads of government and 
their ministers will often be beholden to important constituencies and pressure 
groups, crises alter the constraints upon them. Crises naturally impose strong 
financial and economic constraints that limit the policy options of governments. By 
discrediting some ministries and agencies and by forcing quick, unpleasant 6          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 81 
 
 
choices, however, crises can liberate leaders from interest-group-politics-as-usual 




8.  Prioritization. Crises can raise the issue area to the top of the political agenda, 
prompting action or agreements that had previously been stifled by apathy, 
neglect, or lack of political entrepreneurship. 
 
Two frequent candidates have not been included in this list: ideational convergence and 
power shift. One might be tempted to argue that crises stimulate reassessment of 
policies and institutions leading to a convergence of analytical beliefs and frameworks 
that facilitate institutionalization. More often, in my observation, crises generate vigorous 
debate over causes and widen, rather than narrow, the range of alternative views.  
 
One might also hypothesize that, when they affect countries differently, crises can alter 
the relative power position of states within a region. The 1997/98 Asian financial crisis 
shifted influence within East Asia away from Japan and toward the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), for example (Pempel 1999, 228–232). However, this effect is almost 
always a temporary acceleration or retardation of an underlying structural trend. Rapid 
changes in relative power positions can discourage institutionalization because the 
ascendant state will anticipate a more favorable institutional bargain if it defers 
agreement. 
 
3.2  Background Conditions  
 
Crises are not the only, or necessarily even the primary, determinants of regional 
institution building. They occur against the background of existing circumstances which 
configure a region’s predilection toward regionalism. Moreover, crises cannot stimulate 
institution building directly; instead, national officials, international civil servants, and pre-
existing regional forums construct them. These officials, in turn, exercise partially 
independent choice. Whether any given crisis will generate institution building thus 
depends on a set of third variables.  
 
The set of variables that we might expect to condition the regional response to crises is 
potentially as broad as the literature on regional integration. Neofunctionalism, 
institutionalism, realism, constructivism, and domestic politics and epistemic approaches 
would each advance candidates for this list.
3 These variables include pre-existing 
regional institutions, intergovernmental and transnational networks, norms, ideas, 
regional dominance, intra-regional rivalry, linkages to political integration, security 
externalities, and geopolitics.  
 
                                                 
2  The agency role of executive officials in the domestic context is captured by the aphorism attributed to 
United States President Barack Obama’s Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel:  “You never want a serious 
crisis to go to waste.”  Gerald F. Seib. In Crisis, Opportunity. Wall Street Journal. 21 November 2008. p. 
A2. 
3  Reviews of these approaches and how they apply to regional integration can be found, for example, in 
Wallace, Wallace, and Pollack 2005; Caporaso 2007; Eichengreen 2006; Henning 2006; and the special 
issue of the Journal of European Public Policy devoted to the neofunctionalist legacy (April 2005). Economic Crises and Institutions for Regional Economic Cooperation  |       7 
 
I have stressed the role of institutions and preferences in the context of multilateral 
arrangements in my work. The source of the shock (whether internal or external to the 
region) and the response of the multilateral regime strongly condition the regional 
reaction (Henning 2002 and 2009). US–European conflict over exchange rate policy and 
the balance of payments preceded each of the European initiatives to strengthen 
regional monetary integration, for example. The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) has similarly 
depended on the nature of the shock and the response by the IMF. The more disruptive 
and external the shocks, and the less adequate the IMF’s response, the stronger the 
impetus for the CMI multilateralization.
4  
 
The treatments of crises in the remainder of the paper will devote particular attention to 
the following arguments, drawn from several of these theoretical perspectives. We 
expect that a crisis will stimulate the building of common institutions within a region in 
the presence of 
 
(i)  a secretariat that is charged with fostering cooperation; 
(ii)  substantially integrated markets for goods, services, and capital;
5  
(iii)  functional linkages to pre-existing agreements in related economic areas;
6 
(iv)  a single dominant country within the region; 
(v)  preferences that conflict with the relevant multilateral institution; and 
(vi)  a benign posture toward regionalism on the part of the US. 
 
Conversely, in the absence of these background conditions, we would not expect crises 
to produce institution building. 
 
3.3 Alternative  Outcomes 
 
There is no a priori reason to expect that crises cannot also weaken or destroy regional 
institutions, just as they might multilateral or national institutions. The 1992/93 crisis in 
the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System witnessed the 
ejection of the British pound and the Italian lira from the regime, and a formal widening of 
the bands of exchange rate fluctuation. A constructive response, though ultimately 
forthcoming, was by no means inevitable. In the absence of these background 
conditions, therefore, we might observe crises causing institutional decay. 
 
                                                 
4  During the recent crisis, these indicators were partially offsetting:  the shock source was clearly external, 
but the multilateral response (including direct support from the US) was also much more congruent with 
Asian preferences than in 1997/98.   
5  Market integration refers to the mutual penetration of national markets as distinct from the adoption of 
common regional frameworks and regulations to govern markets.  It is thus measured, for example, as 
trade flows relative to gross domestic product (GDP), capital flows relative to domestic market 
capitalization, and price convergences across borders. 
6  Functional linkages refer to the consequences in one sector of regional cooperation of disturbances in 
another.  For example, drastic shifts in the exchange rates among European currencies created severe 
problems for the administration of the Common Agricultural Policy owing to the methods used to 
calculate price supports and compensate producers.  A political-economic process distinct from simple 
cross-border economic effects, such linkages evoke references to spillover in the neofunctionalist 
literature. 8          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 81 
 
 
To list the set of possible outcomes comprehensively, we must acknowledge that it is 
also possible in principle that a crisis might have no effect on regional institutions. One 
variation on this outcome would be an apparent effect that proves transitory, leaving the 
degree of institutionalization unchanged in the long term. No effect can be treated as the 
null hypothesis and the cases of crises can be used to test whether outcomes differ 
substantially from it and, if so, in which direction.  
 
Finally, in cases where crises do contribute to the creation or strengthening of regional 
institutions, we would expect this to apply primarily to a specific set of institutions – those 
that provide defenses against crises or the means to manage them. In response to a 
balance-of- payments crisis, for example, we might expect states to create balance-of-
payments financing facilities and bodies and processes to activate them—not free trade 
areas, customs unions, or other regional arrangements unrelated to the crisis. We 
expect the functional form of the crisis to dictate the type of institutional response. 
 
 
4.   Cases of Crises and Regional Responses 
 
Consider now the prominent cases of economic and financial crisis in the last 4 decades. 
We begin with the treatment of Europe and the process of monetary integration, which 
was punctuated by a number of crises over the span of several decades. We then 
consider specific crises and responses, beginning with the first oil shock and the nearly 
forgotten 1975 agreement to create a Financial Stabilization Fund. The section then 
addresses the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, the Mexican peso crisis of 
1994/95, the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98, and the Asian dimension of the 2007–09 
crisis. It is interesting to observe how the regions in Asia, North America, and Latin 
America were responding while Europe was grappling with monetary and financial 
disturbances. 
 
4.1 European  Monetary  Integration 
 
A substantial literature addresses the political economy of exchange rate stabilization, 
macroeconomic convergence, and the creation of the euro. Authors emphasize various 










14 and political integration.
15 My own 
                                                 
7  Padoa-Schioppa (1990), Delors Report (1989), Commission of the European Communities (1990).  See 
also Eichengreen (1996, 3–12). 
8  Giavazzi and Pagano (1988), Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989).  Those opposing the German dominance 
school included Fratianni and von Hagen (1992).  The debate is appraised by Woolley (1992), Gros and 
Thygesen (1992, 100–160), and Willett and Andrews (1997).  See also Cohen (1993), who argues that 
local hegemony is critical to sustaining monetary unions once created, and Dyson (1994). 
9  See especially Frieden (1994, 2001, 2002, and 2003). 
10  See especially Moravcsik 1991 and 1998. 
11  Martin 1993, Cohen 1993, Pauly 1992. 
12  Sandholtz and Zysman 1989. 
13 McNamara  1998. 
14  See, for example, Sandholtz 1993. Economic Crises and Institutions for Regional Economic Cooperation  |       9 
 
contribution emphasizes the international monetary system and disturbances transmitted 
through it as the context for monetary integration. This approach gives pride of place to 
conflicts between Europe and the US over exchange rates, the balance of payments, 
and macroeconomic adjustment as incentives for European cooperation (Henning 1998). 
Because several of these episodes were full-blown crises, a review of that approach is 
suitable here.  
 
International monetary conflict and turbulence provides strong incentives for groupings 
of vulnerable states to consider regional monetary cooperation in order to create an 
island of monetary stability. Regional arrangements help countries limit the shifts in intra-
regional exchange rates, deflect pressure for policy adjustments, and perhaps even 
exercise countervailing pressure on a dominant state outside the region. Beginning in 
the 1960s, the US ran large current account deficits during several episodes, pressured 
the governments of surplus countries to stimulate their economies, and encouraged 
depreciation of the dollar in order to persuade them to comply and otherwise achieve 
adjustment. Confronted by the appreciation of their currencies, the surplus countries, 
which frequently included Germany, could expect a drop in exports, growth, and 
employment, which reinforced US demands for macroeconomic stimulus. Elsewhere, I 
have referred to the use of the exchange rate in this way as the “dollar weapon,” 
discussed its underpinnings, and described its weakening in the hands of the US during 
the decade after 2000 (Henning 2006).  
 
In the teeth of the conflict, European governments parried, deflected, but ultimately often 
accommodated US pressure for macroeconomic adjustment. The recurrence of US 
pressure and international monetary instability generated sustained interest among 
targets in developing regional arrangements as defensive mechanisms. After periods of 
transatlantic monetary conflict, therefore, Europe responded with initiatives for currency 
cooperation. Conversely, during periods of transatlantic monetary tranquility, the impetus 
for monetary integration tended to flag. 
 
The narrative, in brief, begins with the Bretton Woods regime, the context for the origins 
of the European Community. Because that regime stabilized European cross rates at the 
same time as it stabilized European currencies against the dollar, monetary matters 
were virtually off the agenda of early European integration. As the Bretton Woods regime 
experienced a succession of currency crises in the 1960s and then collapsed altogether 
in the early 1970s, however, the Europeans developed plans for currency cooperation. If 
the Bretton Woods regime had remained intact, European governments would not have 
sought regional exchange rate stabilization. 
 
As much of the rest of the world went to flexible exchange rates during the 1970s, 
Europe experimented with the “snake.” Conflict with the Carter administration during 
1977/78 persuaded West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and French President 
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing of the benefits of tightening the European monetary regime. 
They thus created the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979. Conflicts with the US 
during the Plaza and Louvre accords in the mid-1980s and during 1990 and 1991 helped 
                                                                                                                                                 
15  Sandholtz 1993, Woolley 1994, Andrews 1993, Garrett 1993.  Eichengreen and Frieden (1994) discuss 
approaches to analyzing the Maastricht treaty commitments. 10          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 81 
 
 
to reinforce the process leading to the Maastricht treaty.
16 (We consider subsequent 
episodes in the sections below.) Exchange rate and balance of payments crises were 
thus integral to the process of European monetary integration.  
 
There were large and sometimes heated conflicts among countries within the region, of 
course. Member states exhibited considerable variation in their macroeconomic 
preferences and disagreements over the direction and design of common monetary 
arrangements. West Germany was famously devoted to monetary orthodoxy and fiscal 
conservatism to restrain inflation while benefiting from external demand and export-led 
growth. France and Italy pursued monetary and fiscal activism in efforts to sustain 
domestic demand and employment. Conflicts with the US served to highlight the benefits 
to macroeconomic convergence in Europe as a route to monetary integration. Such 
conflicts placed particularly strong pressure on the outliers in intra-European debates:
17 
France in 1973, West Germany in 1978, France in 1983, and West Germany in 1987. 
France gradually relinquished its attachment to monetary activism and accepted a price-
stability orientation. The Bundesbank, hostile to the EMS at the time of the system’s 
creation, became a defender of the system by the mid-1980s, and West Germany 
gambled on the durability of the stability orientation of its partners when concluding the 
Maastricht treaty. US-generated disturbances did not extinguish intra-European 
disputes, but they increased the payoff from intra-European accommodation.  
 
Conflict and crises were not the only important factors, of course. Three background 
conditions were particularly important also. First, Europe had a substantial degree of 
intra-regional market integration. In the mid-1970s, intra-European exports were about 
45% of total European exports and about 8%–9% of European gross domestic product 
(GDP). Cross-rate shifts could therefore disrupt a significant amount of trade and 
investment. Second, Europe had a set of common policies with respect to agriculture, 
trade, competition, development, and structural cohesion, and was almost continuously 
negotiating enlargement of its membership. Political and institutional linkages among 
these policies facilitated a regional response to crises. Third, the institutional structure of 
the European Community had established forums for ministers and heads of 
government, regularized meetings among them, a committee of central bank officials 
responsible for operating currency arrangements, and a Commission with strong 
bureaucratic incentives to support further integration.  
 
For crises to have a sustained effect on regional integration, member states must not 
abandon post-crisis monetary arrangements during periods of tranquility. By creating 
organizational actors and political bargains, governments institutionalize regionally the 
lessons of earlier conflicts. With institutions in place, and the analytical capacity and 
                                                 
16  Treatments of these episodes can be found in Putnam and Henning (1989), Destler and Henning (1989), 
and Henning (1994), among a number of other places. 
17  Because regional arrangements provide defenses against systemic disruption, the outlier is inherently 
more exposed and vulnerable to pressure for policy adjustment emanating from the dominant state.  The 
situation is analogous to a herd of cattle on the open range.  In fair weather, cattle maximize their grass 
consumption by grazing apart; when a storm approaches, they gather together for shelter against the 
wind.  The animal that stands aloof will be driven by wind and rain into the fold.  It does not lose its 
appetite for grass but trades off maximizing this commodity for the shelter of the herd.  So it is for 
secondary states buffeted by international monetary storms (Henning 1998, 547). Economic Crises and Institutions for Regional Economic Cooperation  |       11 
 
institutional memory they provide, each successive external shock raises the expectation 
on the part of vulnerable states that similar shocks will occur in the future. Defensive 
arrangements set in place after previous episodes, moreover, alter the set of choices 
available to small states when responding to subsequent episodes, creating path 
dependency. Within a semi-institutionalized region, states can thus be expected to 
bolster cooperation after each international monetary crisis more than they allow it to 
decay between disturbances, producing an upward ratcheting of regional integration.  
 
Three further points, relating to the comparison to East Asia, deserve note. First, while 
Europe was tightening monetary cooperation over a succession of international 
monetary conflicts, other regions followed different paths even though they faced a 
similar external environment. In East Asia, Japan was the target of pressure for 
macroeconomic stimulus at least as much as West Germany was in Europe, the 
Republic of Korea; Taipei,China; and the PRC were also subject to US pressure for 
currency appreciation. So, differences in regional responses should be attributable to 
differences in the politics and institutions of the regions.  
 
Second, and relatedly, the observations about ratcheting suggest that the central 
explanatory question can be usefully restated as: What are the necessary preconditions 
for upward ratcheting to prevail over a succession of crises rather than decay?  Market 
integration, interlocking agreements, and institutions helped to make the European 
response to conflict and crisis cumulative. But a single case cannot settle arguments 
over which are the decisive factors. Comparison to the experience of other regions can 
shed useful light. 
 
Third, while US policy was confrontational during these episodes in terms of exchange 
rate and macroeconomic policy, US policymakers did not oppose monetary regionalism 
in Europe. Washington accepted the creation of the snake and the EMS, and supported 
the Maastricht treaty and the transition to EMU, notwithstanding the fact that Europe was 
creating a competitor to the US dollar as an international currency.  Washington’s 




4.2.  Oil Crisis of 1973–74 and OECD Financial Support Fund 
 
The first oil shock affected the EU, member countries of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), as well as the broader membership of 
multilateral institutions such as the IMF. But the response was different in each case. 
While the Europeans tentatively pledged themselves to exchange rate cooperation in the 
snake and deployed short- and medium-term financial assistance facilities, the 
executives of the governments of the OECD countries agreed to create a new fund, but 
then allowed the initiative to languish and eventually die from neglect. The OECD’s 
Financial Support Fund (FSF) is thus an episode of failure to strengthen an institution in 
                                                 
18  The argument that the multilateral context—the policies of the US and international economic conflict— 
drives regional cooperation is directly applicable to East Asia after the 1997/98 financial crisis and is 
discussed below (Henning 2002 and 2008). 12          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 81 
 
 
the aftermath of a crisis, despite having an international secretariat invested in the 
proposal and the backing of powerful government bureaucracies.
19 
 
In response to the oil shock, US Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger proposed the 
creation of a financial safety net for OECD countries in order to counter the Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and to help maintain the solidarity of the 
Atlantic alliance and US–Japan security ties.
20 During a moment of weakness, US 
Treasury Secretary William E. Simon acceded to and advanced this proposal, designed 
as an inducement for European states and Japan to take a firm, collective stand in 
energy talks with oil producers. An agreement was swiftly concluded in the spring of 
1975. Under it, the FSF was to be established in the amount of $25 billion from the 
contributions of OECD members and lent to members to cover balance of payments 
needs, which were expected to be large and variable in the new era of high oil prices.  
 
The agreement raised a series of questions, however, about the respective roles of 
private and official financing and of the IMF and other international organizations. One 
question was whether the private financial system could recycle petrodollars from oil 
exporters to deficit countries without the intermediation of the official sector. Even 
Secretary Simon thought that an official safety net was probably unnecessary. A second 
question was whether the FSF could in practice be nested within the rules and policies 
of the IMF. While the new facility was intended to be a backstop to the IMF and impose 
IMF-like conditions, it would be administered by the OECD secretariat and the modalities 
of coordination and resolution of any conflicts between the two institutions were 
ambiguous. Ultimately, the agreement died of inaction in Congress with the assent of the 
Carter administration. 
 
In his interesting study of this episode, Cohen (1997) emphasizes the influence of ideas 
and the forceful diplomacy of the US as the main explanations for the initial acceptance 
and ultimate rejection of the FSF. My reading of this case gives primacy to the triangular 
relationship among the US State Department, Treasury Department, and the 
Congress—which he also presents. The State Department preferred the OECD as the 
locus of efforts to provide payments financing because it had the lead in representing the 
US in Paris, whereas the Treasury Department preferred the IMF where it had the lead. 
Although Kissinger had the upper hand in bureaucratic competition with Simon during 
the acute phase of the crisis, resulting in the advancement of the negotiations, Treasury 
reasserted itself as the crisis dissipated and petrodollar recycling expanded.  
 
More importantly, the US Congress looked askance at creating a second international 
financial agency for a purpose for which it thought it had already funded the IMF. 
Congress is often criticized for its role in international monetary and financial policy. But 
in this case it played a constructive role, insisting on the rationalization of institutional 
arrangements that had been made unnecessarily complex by bureaucratic politics.
21 
Congress rejected the FSF in favor of a new facility, the Supplementary Financing 
                                                 
19  “Region” in this particular case is thus defined by level of development rather than geography.  Mistry 
(1999) argues for defining a region as broadly as the geographical scope of the effects of a crisis.   
20  This section relies on Cohen (1997), the only serious treatment of this interesting case.    
21  For a definitive treatment of the congressional politics of the IMF, see Lavelle (forthcoming). Economic Crises and Institutions for Regional Economic Cooperation  |       13 
 
Facility (SFF, also referred to as the Witteveen facility), within the IMF and, shortly 
thereafter, expanding the IMF’s quotas. 
 
There are a couple of additional observations about this case that resonate with others 
below. First, the domestic politics of the dominant state was essential to understanding 
the episode. US officials’ interpretation of national interests was shifting and government 
preferences were unstable. The state was disaggregated, a set of agencies and 
branches sometimes working at cross purposes. Second, the advocacy and 
entrepreneurship of an able secretariat was insufficient to secure adoption of the 
proposal. This was due in part to conflict with an equally capable and better-situated 
opposing secretariat, the IMF managing director and his staff. Nonetheless, third, the 
competition between the secretariats of the OECD and the IMF was secondary to 
interagency conflict in the US. “Nothing was more critical,” Cohen  (1997,  22) writes, 
“than the rival institutional ambitions of the State Department and Treasury.” Finally, the 
linkage between security and finance could not be sustained in this instance. 
 
4.3.  Latin American Debt Crisis of the 1980s 
 
Without the benefit of hindsight, an analyst might be forgiven for anticipating that a 
financial crisis of the magnitude that struck Latin America in 1982 would provoke a 
substantial regional response. Latin America had many of the qualities that might have 
been expected to favor regionalism. Relative to other regions, including Europe, it had 
cultural and linguistic homogeneity. Its members largely shared the state-led 
development strategy of import-substitution industrialization. The Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based in Santiago, Chile, had 
established itself as an informal regional secretariat. Structural economics, developed by 
Raúl Prebisch as ECLAC’s director in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and then 
dependency theory was widely shared as an economic ideology, one that fostered 
regional integration as an alternative to market-friendly multilateral trade liberalization. 
The debt crisis struck nearly all of the members of the region—their interests converged 
as debtors—and most were similarly antagonized by the policies of the US and the IMF. 
Yet, the outcome in the region was far different from the response of East Asia after the 
1997/98 crisis. 
 
The acute phase of the debt crisis began in August 1982, when the Mexican finance 
minister announced to the US Treasury Secretary that Mexico could not service its loans 
to private banks without an emergency financial package. Within a short time, more than 
forty countries succumbed. Africa was also involved, but in smaller absolute magnitudes. 
East Asia, while impacted, largely escaped having to reschedule external debt—the one 
exception being the Philippines. This crisis was thus largely concentrated in Latin 
America.  
 
The literature on the debt crisis of the 1980s, which preoccupied much of the writing 
within international finance, international development, and international political 
economy during the decade, was mainly organized around the normative questions of 
the policy response: Were Latin American countries illiquid or insolvent? How should the 
threat to the international banking system be addressed? How should creditor 
governments respond and what was the proper role of the IMF? Who was bearing and 14          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 81 
 
 
should bear the cost of stabilizing the financial system? Must debt relief be granted? 
(See Sachs 1988, Eichengreen and Lindert 1989, Lissakers 1991, Cohen 1992, Cline 
1995, and Aggarwal 1996.) Revisiting this literature after more than a decade, one is 
struck by the relative simplicity of the problems compared to those that confronted the 
international community in the succession of subsequent crises. (For a comparison of 
the management of the 1980s debt crisis to the Mexican peso crisis, see Henning 1996.) 
Comparatively little has been written about the regional response.
22 
 
Latin America nonetheless had a fairly strong tradition of regionalism prior to the crisis 
and had constructed a broad range of regional, subregional, and cross-regional 
institutions. At the broadest level, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) were both headquartered in Washington, DC. 
At the subregional level, the Central American Common Market, Andean Community, 
and Caribbean Community, among others, pre-dated the debt crisis.
23 Each subregional 
group created a development bank to supplement the work of the IDB and World Bank. 
These supplemented clearing and settlement systems that had been created to facilitate 
intraregional trade. For liquidity and balance of payments support, the least developed 
area of regional financial cooperation, the Central American Monetary Stabilization Fund 
and the Andean Reserve Fund had been established. (The multiplicity of regional and 
subregional institutions with participation by outsiders loosely compares to the patchwork 
of regimes in East Asia in later decades.) The crisis thus disrupted a number of 
agreements that had been previously put in place and secretariats that might have 
served as the focal point for regional and subregional responses. 
 
As Titelman (2006) reports, the crisis undermined most of these regional institutions, 
hitting clearing and settlement systems hardest, and the subregional development banks 
as well. The Andean Reserve Fund (ARF) lent substantially more to the Andean 
countries during 1983–89 than the IMF lent under exceptional financing arrangements. 
The ARF, which became the Latin American Reserve Fund (LARF) with the accession of 
Costa Rica in 1989, thus later inspired proposals for its expansion (Agosin 2001 and 
Ocampo 2002). While its financing might have been significant among its particular 
members, the ARF was a small player in the larger debt crisis and in the event did not 
leverage the crisis into greater capital commitments or institutional strengthening. The 
debt crisis also weakened most of the subregional trade agreements, with the exception 
of the creation of an agreement between Brazil and Argentina that laid the basis for 
Mercosur’s establishment in 1991. (For an assessment of the impact at the time of the 
crisis, see Gauhar 1985.) 
 
A small literature inspired by the prospect of a “debtors’ cartel” was an exception to the 
general absence of political economy studies of the regional response to the debt crisis. 
The logic behind a debtors’ cartel was clear: the crisis was not simply a matter of 
illiquidity, some degree of debt reduction was also necessary; individually, countries 
would not opt for or demand debt reduction as this would place them at a disadvantage 
                                                 
22  The comparative literature on financial systems and policy reform in the wake of the crisis includes 
Frieden 1991, Williamson 1994, and Haggard and Lee 1995. 
23  Jorge Dominguez (2009) reviews these, emphasizing the trade and political features, in his paper for this 
project. Economic Crises and Institutions for Regional Economic Cooperation  |       15 
 
in capital markets; but together debtors could have greater bargaining leverage in 
relation to creditors and would be less likely to be blacklisted from future borrowing. In 
the event, most debtors did not make true transfers of resources back to creditors; with 
the exception of Mexico, Venezuela, and Ecuador, debtors made repayments from loan 
rollovers (Lindert 1989). But each debtor chose to negotiate individually with creditors 
rather than collectively; debt reduction was effectively accomplished in an ad hoc, 
uncoordinated, non-transparent fashion across the region. 
 
The failure of the debtors’ cartel was due to several factors. First, despite being similarly 
affected by the crisis, the economic situations of the debtors differed enough to lead 
some to conclude that they could get better terms by negotiating directly rather than 
through a cartel. Second, the international banks were implacably hostile to any 
arrangement that accepted transparent, ex ante debt reduction. Third, low rates of 
domestic savings and low foreign exchange reserve holdings rendered Latin American 
debtors crucially dependent on capital inflows and thus on appeasing the banks. Fourth, 
US policymakers, concerned most for the stability of the banking system, sided firmly 
with the banks—at least until the threat to systemic stability had passed. (On the failure 
of the debtors’ cartel, see Dietz 1987; Hojman 1987; Kugler 1987; and Lissakers 1991, 
198–204. On US policy, see Cohen 1992). 
 
The debtors’ cartel concept was a narrow regional proposal, one with clear zero-sum 
distributional consequences. What explains the failure of other regional initiatives, ones 
that would not have so obviously harmed the interests of powerful private actors, to 
emerge? There are several plausible answers. First, regional and subregional 
institutions, which antedated the crisis, did not have the staff, financial resources, or 
legal mandate that would have enabled them to leverage the crisis into greater 
delegation from member states. Second, regional trade agreements were not developed 
to the point where their disruption could inflict major economic pain in member countries. 
Regional exports relative to total exports dropped from above 22% in 1980 to less than 
12% in 1985—the largest 5-year decline in any of the major regions of the postwar 
period. But these numbers represented only 3.6% and 1.7% of regional GDP 
respectively,
24 apparently below the threshold for provoking a regional response. Third, 
more influential in this region than any other, the US was not particularly inclined toward 
Latin American regionalism: “US governments have felt deep ambivalence about 
supporting a more fully institutionalized regionalism that other states might use as a 
shield against the US,” Katzenstein (2005, 226–7) writes. In addition, “The inter-
American system was never based on a congruence of interests that might have 







                                                 
24  Calculated from UNCOMTRADE data.   
25  Note the ambiguity in the logic of regional dominance.  Many Latin Americanists, as reported by 
Katzenstein, argue that US dominance impeded the development of regional institutions because 
Washington feared constraints.  A regional version of the hegemonic stability thesis, on the other hand, 
would anticipate that dominant powers construct institutions to serve their purposes in the region. 16          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 81 
 
 
4.4.  NAFTA and the Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994/1995 
 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the peso crisis of 1994/95 
were intimately connected. In anticipation of the entering into force of the agreement, 
multinational corporations and institutional fund managers invested more into Mexico 
than any other emerging market country in the early 1990s. But NAFTA did not provide 
for the policy adjustments that would have been necessary to prevent the crisis nor the 
financial facilities necessary to deal with it once it occurred. The US responded instead 
with a large, ad hoc bilateral rescue package through the Exchange Stabilization Fund in 
concert with financing from the IMF in early 1995.
26 This case is an instance in which a 
crisis certainly failed to strengthen regional institutions and, if anything, probably 
weakened the prospects for creating robust ones. 
 
NAFTA is in essence a free trade agreement coupled with some liberalizing investment 
provisions. It is not a customs union or single market, and it contains little in the way of 
regulatory cooperation. It has no provision for currency stabilization, monetary 
cooperation, fiscal coordination, or development assistance. The Federal Reserve 
negotiated a currency swap agreement with the Bank of Mexico in conjunction with the 
Bank of Canada as an adjunct to NAFTA, which was quickly overwhelmed during the 
1994/95 crisis. NAFTA contained side agreements on labor and the environment, of 
course, as well as established processes for settling disputes in various issue areas. The 
agreement also created the North American Development Bank, a NAFTA Commission, 
and a NAFTA Secretariat. But these institutions exist in name only; they are 
underfunded and nearly invisible in policymaking surrounding trade and investment in 
North America.
27 Instead, as Hufbauer and Schott (2005) observe, NAFTA and the EU 
are “polar opposites” in institutional terms. 
 
NAFTA therefore lacked the surveillance capacity at the regional level to anticipate and 
head off the financial crisis. There was growing consternation within the US Treasury 
department about the overvaluation of the Mexican peso and efforts to persuade the 
Mexican Finance Ministry to address it. But NAFTA placed Mexico under no obligation in 
this respect and provided no institutional hook for the US administration with respect to 
the Mexican government. In political terms, this lacuna was important. NAFTA presented 
the most serious and long-fought debate in the US over trade policy since the Second 
World War. Though currency matters were missing from the debate, the bilateral 
exchange rate bore directly on the issues that were discussed: trade, outsourcing, and 
employment. The depreciation of the peso to half its former value within 15 months of 
the agreement’s coming into force fundamentally changed the terms of competition 
between the two countries.
28 As a partial consequence, to this day NAFTA remains 
controversial in US politics, especially within the Democratic Party, and exercises a 
                                                 
26  Lustig 1998, Henning 1999, and Pastor 2001. 
27  The paper by Jorge Dominguez (2009) for this project is a little more generous. 
28  A depreciation of this magnitude would not have been consistent within Europe’s single market in short-
run political terms.  The far more modest drop of the Italian lira after the 1992 crisis threatened political 
support for the single market and the monetary union in the partner countries.  Eichengreen (1996) 
examines the relationship between economic and monetary integration.  He observes that currency 
misalignments fan protectionist flames and that currencies can become misaligned under both fixed and 
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restraining effect on trade liberalization generally and, for present purposes, regional 
institution building. 
 
Pastor (2001, 5–6), in particular, laments the lack of regional institutions in North 
America: “The agreement eliminates trade and investment barriers, but it assumes that 
the social, economic, and political consequences of dismantling those walls will be trivial. 
. . . Because NAFTA is bereft of institutions, the three countries rarely see—let alone 
address—the connections between the problems or how implementing different policies 
may lead to their acting at cross-purposes. . . . The three countries still tend to focus on 
one problem or one commodity, two countries at a time. . . . We continue to bilateralize 
and compartmentalize . . . the three governments have not learned the lesson of 1994.” 
Pastor advocated replication within North America of many of the institutional analogs of 
the EU. But, as Hufbauer and Schott (2005, 488) observed, “there is no appetite for 
supranationalism in North America.”
29 
 
4.5.  Asian Financial Crisis of 1997/98 and the Chiang Mai Initiative 
 
The 1997/98 episode is a clear case of a crisis that produced regional institution 
building. Key states in East Asia cooperated during the crisis and subsequently launched 
the Chiang Mai Initiative. This section reviews these events in a nutshell and then 
examines the role of the six basic background conditions in this case.  
  
If the Mexican peso crisis was the “first crisis of the twenty-first century,” as Michel 
Camdessus declared, the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis was the second. Beginning with 
Thailand in July 1997, the crisis quickly spread to most of the rest of Southeast Asia and 
the Republic of Korea, before infecting the Russian Federation and Brazil, among 
others, and eventually the US through the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management 
(LTCM). Stabilizing financial markets involved commitments from the international 
community summing to hundreds of billions of dollars. Chastened by the Mexican crisis 
and wary of indulging moral hazard, however, the US and IMF were relatively slow to 
respond at the outset.  
 
Shortly after the onset of the Thai financial crisis in July 1997, the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance famously proposed the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund. The PRC 
government failed to endorse it, however, and the US government opposed it outright, 
offering to create instead a forum in which East Asian concerns could be addressed, the 
Manila Framework Agreement. Japan provided significant bilateral financing to its Asian 
neighbors instead through the New Miyazawa Initiative. The greater share of balance of 
payments support for Southeast Asian countries and the Republic of Korea during the 
crisis nonetheless came from the IMF, which imposed policy conditions that cut deeply 
into the political economy of borrowing countries (IMF 1999a). Such conditionality 
became the center of controversy within the domestic politics and regional discourse in 
East Asia.
30  The literature on the political economy of Asian regionalism is virtually 
                                                 
29  For analysis of the political economy of a prospective monetary union in North America, see Helleiner 
(2006). 
30  The impact of the crisis and the response of individual states is analyzed in Haggard (2000), Pempel 
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united in the assessment that these countries were profoundly alienated from the IMF 




The CMI was launched at a meeting of ASEAN+3 finance ministers in Thailand in 
May 2000. They announced a broad set of objectives for financial cooperation, involving 
policy dialogue, monitoring of capital flows, and reform of international financial 
institutions. The finance ministers would also later add bond market initiatives and 
regional bond funds to their agenda for regional cooperation. But at Chiang Mai, their 
core objective was to establish a network of bilateral swap arrangements (BSAs) 
between Northeast and Southeast Asian members. As these BSAs were negotiated and 
concluded over the subsequent years, their number grew to 16.
32 
 
There are several noteworthy things about these arrangements. First, in principle, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Indonesia can borrow several 
multiples of their IMF quotas through their CMI BSAs. Second, however, their access is 
linked to their negotiating a program with the IMF with its attendant policy 
conditionality—except for the first 20% of their allotment. Conceived as such, the CMI is 
largely a “second” or “parallel line of defense” to IMF financing. The “IMF link,” as this 
provision is called, helped to secure the accession of the PRC government to the CMI 
and mollify the US government. Third, ASEAN+3 finance ministries and central banks 
also launched a regional surveillance mechanism called the Economic Review and 
Policy Dialogue (ERPD). Many officials within the region hoped to develop the ERPD to 
the point where it could define regional conditionality in a crisis and thereby permit a 
diminution, and perhaps eventually elimination, of the IMF link.
33  Finally, partly owing to 
the IMF link, none of the BSAs has been activated, even during the 2007–2009 crisis.  
 
The ASEAN+3 process has been almost entirely intergovernmental. The leaders of the 
ASEAN states invited their counterparts from the PRC, Japan, and the Republic of 
Korea to join them for the first time in the heat of the crisis in November 1997 and have 
been meeting at least annually since then. The CMI was developed by the ASEAN+3 
finance ministries, with their central banks, in meetings of deputy ministers and working 
groups. The ERPD is conducted through the ASEAN+3 finance deputies meeting, which 
central bank deputies attend, twice each a year. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
and the ASEAN Secretariat provide input to the ERPD discussions, as well as IMF staff. 
But much of the surveillance discussion and all of the negotiations surrounding the 
establishment of the CMI and the individual BSAs took place without the benefit of a 
collectively appointed secretariat. 
  
                                                 
31  The development of the CMI and associated policy issues are debated in Henning (2002, 2006), 
Eichengreen (2002), Bergsten and Park (2002), de Brouwer (2004), Kuroda and Kawai (2004), Katada 
(2001, 2004), Rajan and Sirigar (2004), Amyx (2005, 2008), Lee (2006), Park and Wyplosz (2008), and 
Grimes (2006, 2009), among others. 
32  The number in effect at any one time varied, as these arrangements lapsed and were renegotiated and 
reinstated. The CMI rubric and BSAs are described in detail in Henning (2002).  See also Kawai and 
Houser (2007) and Grimes (2009).   
33  Contributions on ASEAN+3 surveillance include Kawai and Houser (2007), Institute for International 
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The CMI should be viewed in the context of a multi-pronged strategy by member states 
with respect to crises and of other developments in regional cooperation. In addition to 
creating a regional self-help mechanism for crises, countries have embraced self-
insurance in the form of unilateral reserve accumulation and have continued to support 
the IMF, their objections to its role in the 1997/98 crisis notwithstanding. Thus, Southeast 
Asian governments and the Republic of Korea have not placed all of their crisis-defense 
eggs in one regional basket; they have diversified. 
 
Member states of the region are also engaged in negotiating multiple, cross-cutting 
bilateral, subregional, and cross-regional preferential trade agreements.
34 While the 
pattern of trade liberalization is broadly consistent with regional financial cooperation, 
there is little or no linkage between the regional initiatives in the trade and financial 
areas. Measures of the degree of integration of markets in East Asia are sensitive to the 
choice of group. For the 17 economies,
35 intra-regional trade has exceeded half of their 
total trade since 2000. But for ASEAN+3 alone, this figure is only about 34%, roughly 
comparable to the current figure for the six original members of the European 
Community.  
 
Tension between Japan and the PRC over the pace, direction, and institutionalization of 
these arrangements has pervaded regional negotiations. The prospective shift in relative 
influence within the region toward the PRC, as its economic growth outpaces that of 
Japan by a wide margin, counsels officials in Beijing to bide their time until they might 
bargain from a more favorable position. Meanwhile, regional initiatives have benefited 
from the tendency of the two countries to compete for the favor of ASEAN with 
cooperative measures (Grimes 2009). But more robust institutional arrangements will 
require transcending or suspending the rivalry. Agreement between the two is a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for deepening institutionalization. 
  
I have argued that the creation and evolution of the CMI can best be explained by the 
global multilateral context and the Sino–Japanese rivalry. The multilateral context—the 
stance of the IMF, the modest influence of Asian governments within it, and the posture 
of US—explains the timing and substantive content of East Asian financial cooperation 
in the CMI. The intra-regional rivalry explains the choice of the institutional form of that 
cooperation—characterized by reluctance to delegate to a secretariat, 
intergovernmentalism, and bilateralism as the defining feature of the network of swap 
arrangements (Henning 2008). 
  
The posture of the US has evolved substantially over the 12 years since the 
1997/98 Asian financial crisis. After working hard to scuttle the AMF proposal in 1997, 
the US Treasury accepted the creation of the CMI in 2000. Speaking in Chiang Mai, 
Assistant Secretary Edwin M. Truman reserved judgment on the ultimate merits of the 
initiative until the details were known.
36 Comforted by the IMF link, however, the 
                                                 
34  See the papers by John Ravenhill (2009) and Richard Baldwin (2011) for this project, as well as Solis, 
Stallings, and Katada (2009). 
35  Australia; New Zealand; Hong Kong, China; and Taipei,China; in addition to ASEAN+3. 
36  Truman said that regional initiatives such as these could be constructive in principle and that greater 
cooperation among Asian countries was “perfectly appropriate.” But he reserved final judgment, 
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administration of George W. Bush did not oppose the further development of the CMI, 
the other regional financial initiatives, or the surveillance mechanism. In 2006, 
Undersecretary Timothy D. Adams offered support for the Regional Bond Market 
Initiative and regional bond funds, professed equanimity with respect to the development 
of an Asian Currency Unit, but added that the lack of clarity of the CMI gave him pause. 
Equally important, the US Treasury supported reforms in the IMF that were advocated 
by many Asian governments, including redistribution of quotas and voting shares, the 
introduction of quick-disbursing, low-conditionality financial facilities, and reconsideration 
of policy conditionality on standby loans. Progress was made on several of these fronts 
when the IMF was enlarged and refitted to combat the 2007–2009 crisis. In addition, the 
US Federal Reserve extended currency swap arrangements to 14 countries in autumn 
2008, including the Republic of Korea and Singapore, in the amount of $30 billion, and 
for Japan, in unlimited amounts.
37 The Republic of Korea drew large amounts from this 
facility to provide dollar liquidity to banks in its successful response to the crisis. Thus, 
while US policy has not actively opposed regional financial cooperation, American 
actions made the regional part of the three-pronged strategy less compelling on the 
margin for some East Asian states. 
 
4.6.  2007–2009 Crisis and CMI Multilateralization 
 
The importance of crisis as a catalyst for institutionalization of regional cooperation was 
reinforced by the 2007–2009 crisis. ASEAN+3 finance ministers first articulated the 
objective of creating a common fund from the bilateral swap arrangements—to which 
they attached the term multilateralization—at their annual meeting in Istanbul in 2005.
38 
A liquidity bubble characterized the global economy during the mid-2000s, however, and 
East Asian states were accumulating foreign exchange reserves. Although some 
countries experienced financial tremors, these were isolated events. Creating a common 
financial facility was thus not a high priority for the region as a whole and progress 
toward this objective was slow.
39 After it became clear in 2008 that the recession that 
enveloped the US and Europe owing to the subprime crisis would threaten East Asian 
economies, however, governments of the region refocused on this objective. Given that 
the CMI was not activated during the crisis, the relevance and credibility of these 
arrangements hinged at least in part on ASEAN+3 governments demonstrating progress 
toward their declared objective of a common fund. The most difficult matter, in addition 
to several important technical ones, was the relative shares of the three Northeast Asian 
states in the new arrangement, and those of Japan and the PRC in particular.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
adjustment, then I think they are to be commended, but we don’t know what will happen yet” (Scott and 
Areddy 2000). 
37 US Federal Reserve Board press release. 29 October 2008. Washington, DC. Available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081029b.htm. 
38  ASEAN+3 finance ministers’ statement, para 5. 4 May 2005. Istanbul. 
39  While announcing some progress at their meeting in Kyoto in 2007, the finance ministers launched 
studies on the key elements of a “self-managed reserve pooling arrangement” with an eye toward 
developing a consensus.  ASEAN+3 finance ministers statement, para 6. 5 May 2007. Kyoto. Economic Crises and Institutions for Regional Economic Cooperation  |       21 
 
Meeting in Bali, Indonesia, on the margin of the ADB meetings in May 2009, the finance 
ministers announced agreement on the main features of the CMI multilateralization 
(CMIM):
40 
(i)  Members would earmark at total of $120 billion in their reserves and 
place them at the disposal of the fund.
41 
(ii)  They agreed on the specific contributions of each member. Specifically, 
the PRC and Japan would each contribute 32% of the total, with Hong 
Kong, China contributing a 3.5% share as part of the PRC’s share. Hong 
Kong, China’s inclusion was significant.
42 
(iii)  Borrowing limits were defined as multiples of a member’s quota.
43 
(iv)  Fundamental issues such as membership and lending terms would be 
decided by consensus, while lending would be decided by majority. 
  
The CMIM would retain the link to the IMF, but the linked proportion was subject to 
review. Reducing it would continue to hinge on development of a robust regional 
surveillance mechanism for which the finance ministers committed to establishing an 
“independent surveillance unit.” Finally, the deputy finance ministers were tasked with 
concluding a detailed agreement by the end of 2009 that could provide for implementing 
the CMIM. 
 
The progression from the CMI, a network of bilateral swap arrangements, to the CMIM, a 
common institution, is a potentially profound movement. As a common regional facility, 
the ASEAN+3 partners in the CMIM commit themselves to a joint decision making 
process. Moreover, the majority rule for lending decisions provides in theory for 
individual members, even Japan or the PRC, to be overruled. This shift, in principle, is 
akin to the transition from a free trade area to a customs union, which requires a 
common decision on external tariffs and a governing body or process for making the(se) 
decision(s). If ASEAN+3 were to implement common decision-making fully, this would 
represent a profound change in regional politics. 
 
East Asian governments are hedging in their move to the common fund, however, by 
expanding many of their bilateral swap facilities. While planning to retire many of their 
bilateral dollar swaps in favor of the CMIM, Japan and the PRC have dramatically 
expanded their bilateral local currency swaps. After the Federal Reserve extended swap 
arrangements in October 2008, the People’s Bank of China signed bilateral swap 
agreements with five countries (the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Belarus, 
and Argentina) in the amount of CNY650 billion (about $95 billion). The Bank of Japan 
also offered a large yen–won swap to the Republic of Korea in December 2008. When 
the CMIM agreement was announced in Bali, the Japanese Ministry of Finance 
announced that up to $60 billion equivalent of yen swaps would also be made available 
to Asian partners on a bilateral basis and subsequently announced an agreement with 
                                                 
40  ASEAN+3 finance ministers’ statement, paras 7–9. 3 May 2009. Comments by Giovanni Capannelli at 
the Honolulu workshop. 
41  This number had been decided at meetings during the previous February. 
42  The following shares apply to the other countries: the Republic of Korea (16%); Thailand, Singapore, 
Indonesia, and Malaysia (4%) each; those of the remaining six Southeast Asian members sum to 4%.  
Overall, the three Northeast Asian countries contribute 80% and the ASEAN 10 contribute 20%. 
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Indonesia. Although the stated purpose of several of these new swaps is liquidity 
provision, as distinct from balance-of-payments support, the line between the two is 
often blurred in practice.  
 
Taken together, the 1997/98 and 2007–09 episodes highlight the importance of crises as 
generators of regional institutions. Skeptics might argue about the significance of the 
CMI, given that it has not been used. But few would argue that the crisis was not a direct 
motivation for the creation of the CMI. The evolution of the CMI reinforces this 
interpretation: the impetus toward regional surveillance and a common fund flagged 
during the liquidity boom years when the threat of crises was small and then accelerated 
when crisis loomed again in 2008. Agreement on the divisive issues surrounding the 
CMIM would have been considerably less likely in the absence of the 2007–2009 crisis. 
These episodes also suggest that crisis was more than a mere accelerator of some 
hypothetical underlying trend toward regionalism; it is hard to imagine a counterfactual 
scenario without financial crises that could have brought East Asia to the threshold of 
CMIM implementation in late 2009. 
 
4.7.  Further Observations on the European Case 
 
Before concluding this section, two sets of observations are germane regarding the role 
of political leaders and international secretariats in the genesis of the EMS and the role 
of aspirations for political union in the genesis of the monetary union. 
 
EMS. Comparing present-day European to Asian and Latin American institutions is not 
as productive as focusing on earlier decades of European integration, decades that 
correspond to present-day arrangements in the other regions. The European experience 
of the late 1960s and 1970s holds particular lessons for East Asia. During this period, 
intra-regional exports as a percentage of total exports were about 45% in the EU6 
compared to about one-third for the present-day ASEAN+3.
44 During this period, the 
international monetary regime underwent the transition from fixed to flexible exchange 
rates, confronting Europe with the question of whether and how to stabilize cross-rates. 
East Asia faces a similar transition from the Bretton Woods II regime.
45 Advocates of 
Asian institutionalization would do well to consider the European institution building and 
delegation during this period especially closely. 
 
First, the accord between West German Chancellor Schmidt and French President 
Giscard d’Estaing placed regional exchange rate stabilization on a firm path. Their plan 
for the EMS was discussed and agreed upon by the two of them, and essentially 
imposed on their finance ministries and central banks. Their personal representatives 
met and consulted with the representatives of their fellow heads of government, and the 
negotiations were later broadened to the ministries. But the bureaucrats were skeptical 
and would not have launched a restructured version of the snake if left to their own 
devices (Ludlow 1982). 
                                                 
44  This figure rises to over 50% for the seventeen countries in East Asia—ASEAN+3 plus Australia; New 
Zealand; Hong Kong, China; and Taipei,China—but should be adjusted downward significantly for 
entrepôt trade through Hong Kong, China and Singapore. 
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Second, for all the attention given to the role of the Commission in supranationalist 
interpretations of European integration, that bureaucracy was often not at the center of 
action in the evolution of the EMS. True, the Commission had been a consistent 
advocate of monetary cooperation and developed the early plans. The President of the 
Commission, the Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs, and the Directorate 
General under him helped to shape the overall strategy for monetary integration and 
conducted surveillance of economic and fiscal policy, which became especially important 
during the transition to EMU. But, in the late 1970s, EU leaders effectively delegated the 
management and operation of the EMS to the central banks and finance ministries, 
working through the Committee of Central Bank Governors,
46  Ecofin, and the Monetary 
Committee. This machinery stood largely apart from the standard institutional apparatus 
of the European Community, in which the Commission’s role is usually central, and 
served as the foundation for the European Monetary Institute, the body that bridged to 
the creation of the European Central Bank (ECB).  
 
Third, although the original EMS agreement was superficially symmetrical in the 
obligations imposed on surplus and deficit countries, the system in fact operated quite 
asymmetrically. The divergence indicator was designed to instill symmetry of adjustment 
obligations. But in practice the divergence indicator was marginalized in favor of the 
parity grid and Germany’s partners undertook foreign exchange intervention to defend 
the margins. In practice, Germany and the Bundesbank dominated the operation and 
management of the EMS. 
 
Fourth, the German position on the terms of monetary cooperation was firm but very 
consistent over the decades: others would have to converge toward West Germany’s 
low rate of inflation; West Germany would not converge toward the European average. 
France, Italy, and the other partners often did not like these terms, but they knew that if 
they met them West Germany was likely to respond positively to integration proposals. 
On the table for a long period, this offer eventually attracted the adherence of the 
partners. The stability of the offer facilitated agreement; the Maastricht treaty would have 
been much less likely if the West German position had shifted from one government to 
the next or with each business cycle.
47 
 
Political Integration. The argument that aspirations for political union underpin the 
evolution of the EU is widely asserted in public commentary and some parts of the 
literature on the European economic integration. EMU, in particular, is frequently cited as 
the product of widely shared political ambition for something akin to a United States of 
Europe (Eichengreen 1992). This notion is widely cited in Asian discourse about 
regionalism and carries a negative implication: if aspirations for political union were 
central in Europe but are absent in Asia, Asian regionalism is not likely to be feasible. 
While commitment to political integration plays a role, however, it has been substantially 
over-rated by some analysts.
48 
 
                                                 
46  On the Committee of Central Bank Governors, see Andrews (2003); on the operation of these institutions 
after the inception of the monetary union, see Henning (2007a and 2007b). 
47 Andrews  (2003). 
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Over the course of postwar history, first of all, economic projects for European 
integration have consistently received greater support than projects for political and 
security cooperation. Proposals for the European Defense Community and the European 
Political Community failed in the 1950s, for example, while the European Economic 
Community succeeded (Dinan 2004). To choose a contemporary example, the 
constitutional treaty would have gone some distance toward political integration, but it 
failed to secure support in critical referenda in France and the Netherlands. The Lisbon 
treaty preserves many of its institutional provisions but falls decidedly short of 
constituting a political union (Reh 2009).   
 
Second, while it is true that war in Western Europe has become unthinkable, it has been 
unthinkable for quite some time, at least since the 1960s and 1970s if not before. 
European integration has continued far beyond the point where interstate violence was a 
conceivable threat. Finally, ambitions for political union do not easily explain the 
successive enlargements of the membership. The United Kingdom, Ireland, and 
Denmark did not join the European Community because they wanted to participate in an 
ever closer political union. Many in successive enlargements are reticent, including the 
10 new members from Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, the greater number and 
diversity of member states spawned by enlargements have created substantial barriers 
to political deepening. For these reasons among others, many political scientists 
conclude that the political unity motive is a contributing, but distinctly secondary, 
motivation for European integration.
49 
 
Analysis of political motivation should carefully distinguish among (i) ambitions for 
political union, (ii) desire to avoid security conflict and war, and (iii) political agreement 
on economic measures and the institutions necessary to implement them. Regional 
integration obviously cannot take place in the face of sharp security conflicts, threats, or 
interstate violence. Ambitions for political integration and a peace community can 
certainly reinforce regional integration, on the other hand, but they are not necessary. 
Political agreements on the economic measures, common policies, and regulations are 
indeed necessary, as is agreement on the institutions that would implement and monitor 
them. But the latter is a substantially lesser hurdle than the former. While the former is 
out of reach in East Asia, and probably in North America as well, the latter is achievable 
in both. 
 
4.8. Results  of  Comparison 
 
The review of these cases generates several observations and insights about the effect 
of crises on institution building within regions. We would not logically expect all crises to 
generate a regional response. When a crisis originates within the region and when the 
extra-regional response is supportive, then regional institution building is not likely. But, 
when a crisis originates outside the region and the extra-regional response is inadequate 
or adversarial, regional institution building is a logical response and we can sensibly ask 
analytical questions about the sources of variation in the regional reaction. In these 
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instances, several background conditions emerge from this comparison as favorable for 
institution building in the wake of a crisis.  
 
First, the presence of a secretariat with a mandate to defend and advance regional 
integration appears to be important, as it characterizes the most successful case, that of 
Europe. Intergovernmental cooperation through the Committee of Central Bank 
Governors (CCBG) and Ecofin was sometimes more important than the activism of the 
Commission in that case, of course, and the FSF experience suggests that a standing 
secretariat is not sufficient, while the CMI case suggests that substantial institution 
building can take place without a secretariat. We can conclude that, while neither strictly 
necessary nor sufficient, a secretariat facilitates further institution building. Notably, 
ASEAN+3 has effectively conceded that an independent secretariat is essential for an 
effective surveillance mechanism.  
 
Second, a significant degree of market integration appears to be necessary but not 
sufficient for post-crisis institution building. The two cases of substantial institution 
building, Europe and East Asia, exhibit moderate to high levels of intra-regional trade; 
but so does North America, which produced little or no institutionalization beyond 
NAFTA after the 1994/95 crisis. 
 
Third, functional spillovers among regional arrangements that are related to trade, 
money, and finance appear to be necessary conditions for an institution-building 
response. Crises must threaten the interests vested in political agreements on related 
economic matters in order to provoke institution building. But the Mexican peso crisis 
case suggests that such linkages alone are not sufficient. 
 
Fourth, the presence of a dominant state appears to have ambivalent effects on regional 
institution building. Germany had greater influence than France over the construction of 
the monetary union in Europe, but that influence fell well short of regional hegemony. US 
dominance of North America contributed to the creation of NAFTA, but probably 
prevented the development of supranational bodies within it. A regional rivalry, as seen 
in East Asia, on the other hand, appears to constrain the depth and form of institutions.  
 
Fifth, the multilateral context matters a great deal: when the international monetary 
system or international financial institutions clash with the preferences of member states, 
these states will seek to build regional institutions that better serve their aspirations. 
Present in both the European and East Asian cases, this condition appears to be 
necessary; present in the debt crisis of the 1980s and the Mexican crisis of 1994–95, 
this condition is clearly not sufficient to produce institution building. Conversely, if the 
multilateral system is benign or supportive, the construction of regional institutions is not 
a high priority and possibly redundant.
50 
 
Sixth, the position of the US on institution building within a region appears to be a 
powerful determinant. No regional institution was constructed over the opposition of the 
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US. European monetary integration benefited from a benign stance in Washington
51 and 
East Asian financial cooperation progressed only after establishing the IMF link and 
thereby shifting the US stance toward neutral. However, US support for regional 
institutions is certainly not sufficient in itself. 
 
One might question the importance of this last finding for the future of regionalism in 
Asia in light of long-term projections of the relative decline of the economic size of the 
US. It is indeed possible that the posture of the US will be less influential in the future 
than it was during the second half of the twentieth century. However, US influence is not 
likely to vanish altogether and the structural shift toward Asian influence over the world 
economy is uncertain. Given the robustness of this historical finding for the most 
important cases of the last 5 decades, it would be unwise to dismiss its potential 
relevance for institution building over even a long planning horizon.    
 
Finally, I have argued that aspirations for political integration or political union are neither 




5.   Regional Institutions as a Defense against Crises 
 
While the previous section addressed the galvanizing effect of crises on regional 
institution building, the present section reverses the focus to examine the effect of 
institutions on the vulnerability of regions to financial and economic crises. To analyze 
the effectiveness of regional institutions, we would in principle want to compare the 
experience of two groups— regions with robust institutions and those without—for their 
ability to avoid crises. In constructing such a test, however, we immediately encounter 
the two issues of (i) what type of regional institution we would expect to provide such 
insulation and (ii) whether there are enough cases on which to build reliable results.   
 
First, we would obviously not expect regions with just any institution to be effective in 
deflecting crises. Only those institutions that could plausibly play a role in reducing 
financial and economic vulnerabilities or combat crises once they strike could provide 
such defenses. Such arrangements would include surveillance mechanisms; peer 
pressure; financial facilities; formal and informal exchange rate arrangements; a 
monetary union, and the secretariats, intergovernmental boards, and bureaucratic 
organizations responsible for operating them. These are a subset of the broader concept 
of institution established at the outset of the paper, which we must now unpack. The 
remaining elements of the broader concept—general institutions of regional governance, 
intergovernmental networks, and agreements outside the monetary and financial field—
are not designed to ward off crises and would have at best an indirect effect on a 
region’s susceptibility to them.  
 
                                                 
51  O’Rourke’s (2009) paper for this project stresses the importance of the US support for European 
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Community and at the expense of the British preferences.   Economic Crises and Institutions for Regional Economic Cooperation  |       27 
 
Another way to select regions with potentially crisis-deflecting institutional arrangements 
is to compare them to the IMF. Almost all of the countries in the regions considered here 
are also members of the IMF, participate in its surveillance mechanism, and have 
access to its financial facilities. Identifying regions that we would expect to provide 
insulation from crisis thus involves identifying the benefits that regional institutional 
arrangements provide beyond those already provided by membership in the IMF. Given 
the developed, formalized nature of the IMF, its experience in dealing with crises, and 
the resources at its disposal, this is a fairly substantial requirement. 
   
Second, given this expectation of the types of regional arrangements that could deflect 
crises, the number of regional candidates for this class of cases is very limited. Certainly, 
no such effect could be expected of institutions in Latin America or North America. Some 
analysts might be tempted to examine East Asia’s CMI as an example of a crisis-
deflecting institution in light of a relatively quick recovery from the 2007–2009 crisis. But, 
as argued below, the CMI was too small and too linked to the IMF for such a test to be 
fair. Until the CMIM is implemented and proves its ability to operate in a crisis, we are 
limited to Europe as the one case where we might reasonably expect regional 
institutions to provide shelter against crises.  
 
Although limited to one region, we can nonetheless get some analytical leverage by 
examining the evolution of European institutions and changes in vulnerability to crises 
over time. The 1992/93 Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) episode is a case of a crisis 
that was not prevented by regional institutions. The transition to EMU during 1997–99 is 
a crisis that did not happen when we might otherwise have expected one to occur. The 
2007–2009 episode is the first case of a severe global crisis after the advent of the 
monetary union and thus the first test of the euro area’s effectiveness in crisis deflection.  
  
This section considers, first, the mechanisms through which regional institutions might 
be expected to provide insulation from crises. It then compares these expectations 
against experience during the 1992/93 ERM crisis, the transition to EMU, and the 2007–
2009 crisis. It concludes with a discussion of the limits of the recent crisis as a test for 
the shielding power of the CMI and a summing up of the lessons of these experiences. 
 
5.1. Causal  Links 
 
When considering how institutional arrangements might shield regions from crisis, we 
must again keep in mind that secretariats, ministerial working groups and councils, and 
monetary and financial agreements are intermediate variables. Regional bureaucracies 
and intergovernmental bodies do not constitute a capacity to deflect crises. Only when 
they work effectively to reduce vulnerabilities by fostering policy adjustment—and 
thereby alignment between regional monetary arrangements, for example, and market 
expectations—can decision-making bodies deter crises. We should acknowledge that, if 
poorly designed, such arrangements could conceivably open regions to financial crises 
rather than shield them. With that important caveat, we would expect well-designed 
regional institutional arrangements to help deflect crises through the following 
mechanisms.  
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(i)  Information. Surveillance mechanisms can provide additional information 
about economic conditions and analysis of vulnerabilities—the first 
ingredient for addressing threats. 
(ii)  Corrective action. Peer pressure can help to induce policy adjustments 
that limit vulnerability. Owing to the regional pattern of contagion, 
neighbors have a strong interest in such corrective action that is balanced 
by reluctance to interfere in the policymaking of neighbors out of fear that 
neighbors will reciprocate in kind.  
(iii)  Mutual financial support. When regions create common financial 
facilities, the resources at their disposal can stabilize regional financial 
and foreign exchange markets though direct intervention in the markets.  
(iv)  Market confidence and expectations. Political commitment to policy 
adjustment and mutual support, and the demonstrated willingness to 
apply these, can help regions guide market expectations to one 
equilibrium and away from others. 
  
With these in mind, consider the role of institutional arrangements in the three European 
episodes below. 
 
5.2. European  Episodes 
 
ERM Crises of 1992/93. The breakup of the ERM of the European Monetary System 
(EMS) during the years immediately following the signing of the Maastricht treaty was by 
far the most spectacular currency crisis up to that time. The causes of the 1992/93 crises 
are examined in a substantial literature published shortly thereafter.
52 We need not 
recount the episode in detail or review the full debate over the causes here. Suffice it to 
say that the (i) hardening of the EMS, (ii) divergence of competitive positions, (iii) 
increase in the volume of capital movements, (iv) divergence of macroeconomic policy in 
the wake of German unification, and (v) political surprises related to ratification of the 
Maastricht treaty all played important roles. Diametrically opposing movements of 
German and British monetary policies were key triggers for the dramatic ejection of the 
British pound and Italian lira from the ERM in mid-September 1992.  
 
The EU, of course, had an elaborate set of regional institutions at the time of this crisis. 
These EU-wide institutions and treaties, as well as broad political support for 
implementing the monetary union, provided the context. The Committee of Central Bank 
Governors, Ecofin, and the Monetary Committee managed the EMS through surveillance 
of the economic policies of the member states, demarches against outliers, and a robust 
set of financial facilities. The latter included the Very-Short-Term Finance facility, the 
Short-Term Monetary Support facility, and the Medium-Term Financial Assistance 
facility. This regional architecture was nonetheless manifestly unable to prevent the 
buildup of misalignments within the system, finance the resulting imbalances, or 
coordinate macroeconomic policy until domestic cost disparities and political 
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uncertainties over the treaty could be resolved. The scale of the problem simply 
overwhelmed these bodies. 
 
European institutions nonetheless provided the basis for a resilient response once the 
crisis subsided. Within a couple of years, European governments had realigned 
exchange rates, brought the lira back into the ERM, initiated convergence, established 
the European Monetary Institute, and coordinated monetary policy closely. Disruptions of 
the Single Market and other common policies of the EU helped to focus government 
leaders on the benefits of moving to the creation of the euro. The crisis had the further 
consequence of shaking loose the member state that was finding convergence to be the 
most politically challenging, the United Kingdom. The stance of outside actors, 
international financial institutions, and the US was benign. The performance of the 
region during the next crisis thus proved to be a stark contrast to that of 1992/93.  
 
Transition to EMU (1997–99). As Asia was suffering a roiling financial crisis, Europe 
executed a remarkably smooth transition to the euro. In retrospect, the transition might 
seem preordained; but it was far from inevitable. Several political disputes and 
unresolved questions could well have undercut the credibility of the transition during the 
run up to the euro’s creation. These included debates over the location of the European 
Monetary Institute and the ECB, the choice of the president of the ECB, the nature of 
economic governance of the monetary union, the terms of the Stability and Growth Pact, 
which countries would qualify for adopting the euro, the external policy of the new union, 
and the subsequent introduction of euro cash.
53 Changes in government in key states 
could have added uncertainty. Given the serial speculative attacks against currency 
pegs elsewhere in the world, it is remarkable that Europe avoided the crisis originating in 
Asia.  
 
What exactly was it about the EMU project that inured Europe to the crisis in this critical, 
formative stage? What inoculated the region from a repetition of the disastrous 
experience of only a few years before? One obvious answer is that exchange rates were 
better aligned and member states’ macroeconomic performances were more 
convergent. But convergence was substantially endogenous to the political economy of 
monetary integration. Government deficits in Italy, to choose a salient example, had 
been reduced by the fall in interest rates that accompanied the expected introduction of 
the euro. Moreover, convergence was not a guarantee that political discord could not 
feed speculation, driving market rates away from their conversion rates even when they 
might be close to long-term equilibrium levels (Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz 1996). 
What, beyond convergence, explains the smooth transition? 
 
Because this is a case of a dog that didn’t bark—that is, a crisis that did not happen— 
there is little written on this question. Several factors, of which some relate to regional 
institutions, are consistent with this outcome. First, the countries that were undergoing 
the most onerous convergence requirements (such as Italy) also derived clear economic 
gains from the monetary union. This made their commitment to the convergence process 
and the monetary union credible. Second, the monetary union was embedded in a larger 
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web of economic integration, including the Single Market, the Common Agricultural 
Policy, and the Community budget. Reneging on the Maastricht commitments could 
threaten these other regional projects as well, imposing costs well beyond any foregone 
benefits of the euro area. Third, as a partial consequence, domestic politics within 
member states were aligned on adoption of the euro and the policy commitments 
necessary to qualify for inclusion. Fourth, and critically, the Maastricht treaty had 
delegated extensive powers to the European Commission (surveillance of fiscal policy) 
and ECB (monetary policy). The ECB had been established and its president had been 
installed 7  months before the transition to the monetary union, while the monetary 
policies of the national central banks were also closely coordinated. Finally, for its part, 
the US took a benign, mildly supportive stance with respect to the creation of the euro 
(Summers 1997, Geithner 1998, and Truman 1999).  
  
2007–2009 Crisis. The recent crisis clearly demonstrates that the monetary union has 
not expunged crises from Europe but has altered the forms in which they manifest. The 
crisis damaged Europe’s banking system and the region suffered a deep recession. 
During the tranquil mid-2000s, moreover, the euro area accentuated another set of 
problems for some of its member countries—divergence, asset bubbles, and default risk. 
Spain and Ireland experienced real estate bubbles that could have arguably been pre-
empted had their central banks operated a monetary policy geared to national 
requirements rather than having to accept the one-size-fits-all monetary policy of the 
euro area. With the onset of the crisis, government intervention to address bank failure 
contributed to serious sovereign debt problems in several euro area countries. Thus, the 
existence of euro area has to a substantial extent simply shifted the particular type of 
crisis to which its members were vulnerable, but has not shielded the members of the 
monetary union from all types.   
 
With that important caveat, it is quite clear that the monetary union prevented the 2007–
2009 crisis from disrupting international payments and currency relationships among its 
members. This is not primarily because of a robust regional response to the imminent 
bankruptcy of the private European financial institutions; that response was mixed at 
best (Posen and Véron 2009). Nor was it primarily a consequence of the Stability and 
Growth Pact governing fiscal policy; several high-debt countries within the euro area saw 
the spreads on government bonds widen to unsustainable levels. Rather, the insulation 
arose from the simple fact that sharing the same currency altered and deferred the 
effects of payments balances and made currency crises impossible.  
 
Central and Eastern Europe was hit earlier and harder than any other region by the 
2007–2009 financial crisis. GDP declined by 14.1% in Estonia, 15.0% in Lithuania and 
18.4% in Lavia during 2009. Other EU countries outside the euro area suffered more 
modest recessions.
54 Countries on the periphery of the EU also suffered, most notably 
Iceland, where GDP declined by more than 6.50% in 2009.  
 
Enlargement of the EU and preparation for eventual entry into the euro area have had 
ambivalent effects on the vulnerability of these countries to crises. On the one hand, by 
harmonizing their policies with those of the EU, adopting the acquis communautaire, and 
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entering the single market, the new member states have attracted foreign direct 
investment and other capital inflows. Combined with weak domestic financial regulation, 
however, these inflows enabled the build-up of large external debts and currency 
mismatches that later threatened collapse.
55 On the other hand, several of the affected 
countries in the region could access Medium-Term Financial Assistance, the balance-of-
payments facility operated by the EU for its members. The EU lent to crisis-stricken 
countries in concert with the IMF. While not shielding new member states from such 
crises, therefore, EU institutions helped to manage the crisis and smooth adjustment in 
this way.  
 
The transition from a nonmarket economy to a member of the EU and euro area is 
clearly fraught with peril. Countries are most vulnerable when they seek to stabilize their 
exchange rates in the presence of high capital mobility, incomplete convergence, and 
weak financial regulation. Once in the euro area, while still vulnerable to other types of 
problems, members are insulated from payments and currency crises. Seeking this 
protection, the initial response of several stricken Central and Eastern European 
countries was to accelerate their timetables for requesting admission to the euro area. 
While the European Commission and ECB responded very cautiously, the European 
Department of the IMF advocated accelerated euro adoption for several of these 
countries. In July 2009, Iceland applied for membership in the EU with an eye toward 
eventually joining the euro area; in January 2011, Estonia became a member of the euro 
area. But the Greek and Irish sovereign debt crises of 2010, which forced a review of the 
key features of the monetary union, raised serious questions about the timetable for 
future enlargements.  
 
The monetary union has had another important consequence, one that resonates with 
the explanation for European monetary integration presented at the beginning of Section 
4. West German Chancellor Schmidt developed the EMS in large measure to spread the 
pressure for currency appreciation across a larger monetary area and deflect pressure 
for fiscal stimulus from the US. During 2007 and 2008, for example, Germany ran 
current account surpluses amounting to 7.5% and 6.4% of GDP, respectively, which 
were very large even by German standards. Had it not been embedded in the euro area, 
Germany would have probably become the target of pressure on the part of the US and 
others for fiscal stimulus. The deutschemark would have appreciated substantially, 
causing an even greater drop in exports, growth, and employment than in fact occurred. 
But because Germany’s surplus was offset by others’ deficits, the overall current 
account position of the euro area was in rough balance and the upward pressure on the 
euro far more moderate. Outside actors were discouraged from attempting moral 
suasion and diplomatic pressure for stronger fiscal stimulus, constrained as Germany 
was at least in principle by the Stability and Growth Pact—notwithstanding a need for 
greater fiscal stimulus in Germany in 2009 to combat a deep recession. Judged on the 
basis of autonomy,
56 Schmidt’s strategy has been spectacularly successful and has 
rendered the dollar weapon, at least so far during this episode, ineffective in the hands 
of the US. 
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5.3.  East Asia (2007–2009) 
 
East Asia as a region experienced growth declines during the 2007–2009 crisis that 
were roughly comparable to emerging and developing countries as a whole, but less 
severe than those in Central and Eastern Europe, and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States. The five Southeast Asian countries that suffered most during the 
1997/98 crisis experienced only half the growth decline during 2007–2009 as during the 
earlier crisis (Goldstein and Xie 2009, Table 2). One might reasonably ask whether this 
relative insulation from the recent crisis owed to the regional arrangements that 
ASEAN+3 had constructed since 1998, the CMI in particular. The CMI, after all, was 
created specifically as a regional self-help mechanism for similar contingencies. On 
greater reflection, however, neither the CMI nor the broader set of regional cooperation 
initiatives sponsored by ASEAN+3 could have been expected to protect Asia from the 
latest crisis. The reasons for this are several. 
  
First, none of the bilateral swap arrangements under the CMI had been activated either 
prior to or during the 2007–09 crisis. At the outset of this episode, therefore, the CMI 
was untested and there is no evidence that financial markets expected activation. The 
CMI cannot plausibly be credited with whatever stability might have been maintained.  
 
Second, were the CMI to have been activated, most of the disbursements would have 
been linked to IMF programs: borrowers would have been able to access no more than 
20% of their swap amounts without submitting to IMF conditionality. This provision made 
CMI activation unattractive in countries where the IMF carried domestic political stigma. 
The Republic of Korea drew instead on the new swap facility opened with the US 
Federal Reserve during its banks’ liquidity crisis in late 2008. Indonesia organized 
support for its government budget through a consortium of funders including the World 
Bank and Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). 
  
Third, the CMI was only one element of a multi-pronged crisis-defense strategy of states 
within the region. The unilateral leg of this strategy was the most important and 
consisted of currency undervaluation, current account surpluses, and reserve 
accumulation as forms of self insurance. It also consisted of reforms of domestic 
financial institutions and careful management of external debt. More than other factors, 
these unilateral measures account for the better performance of East Asia during the 
2007–2009 crisis compared with the 1997/98 crisis, and compared with some other 
regions.
57 The multilateral leg, centering on the IMF, also remained important, 
notwithstanding the stigma attached to the organization. Japan, the PRC, and the 
Republic of Korea continued to support the IMF throughout crisis by agreeing to 
important reforms—including expansion of the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB), 
issuance of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), and an increase in quotas—as well as by 
extending special loans to the institution on a bilateral basis. 
  
Finally, the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves was the flip side of a 
development strategy that left East Asia overly dependent on exports to the US and 
other advanced industrial countries. That export dependence, not exposure to US 
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financial assets, proved to be the greater vulnerability of East Asia during 2007–09 
(Goldstein and Xie 2009, ADB 2009, and Lee 2009). Regional institutions did little or 
nothing to mitigate East Asian countries’ vulnerabilities in these respects. CMI and 
regional surveillance did not fail the region during this period; they simply had not been 
developed to the point where we would expect them to provide substantial protection 
against crises. 
 
Having said that, the institutional arrangements that ASEAN+3 is now committed to 
implementing could indeed be expected to reduce the vulnerability of Asian states in the 
future. The CMIM would not be expected to prevent all crises—just as IMF membership 
or EU membership cannot—and would have to demonstrate its capacity to act in order 
to establish credibility in financial markets. Completing the CMIM and advancing 
surveillance, nonetheless, could establish the basis on which an Asian Monetary Fund 
could eventually be built.
58 
 
5.4. Summing  Up 
 
Regional institutions can provide collective defense against economic and financial 
crises, but are not in themselves a guarantee of a successful defense; their utility 
naturally depends upon their scope and design. Europe experienced multiple currency 
crises within the EMS during 1992/93 despite the presence of institutions that were 
robust compared to other regions. Those institutions nonetheless proved resilient and 
played a central role in fending off crisis during the transition to EMU in 1998/99. The 
delegation of (i) monetary coordination to independent central banks working collectively 
and (ii) the surveillance of fiscal policy and enforcement of fiscal rules to the European 
Commission and Ecofin were critical features of institutional design that distinguished 
the successful transition to EMU from the disastrous 1992/93 crisis. Having learned from 
the 1992/93 episode, these officials worked with a clear eye toward keeping policies and 
exchange rates more consistent with underlying fundamentals and maintaining the 
confidence of foreign exchange and financial markets. An overall political commitment to 
convergence and an ability to threaten miscreants with exclusion bolstered the standing 
of these officials. The 2007–2009 episode demonstrated the value of membership in the 
monetary union in inoculating countries against balance-of-payments and currency 
crises, but the continued vulnerability of euro area countries to banking and sovereign 
debt crises. Clearly, regional institutions must be designed carefully—with operational 
autonomy for experts responsible for managing common projects within a political 
mandate specifying the objectives—and operated cautiously by avoiding misalignments, 
large imbalances, and excessive debt. 
 
 
6.  Policy and Institutional Recommendations 
 
Our examination of the effect of crises on regional institution building and the effects of 
institutions on the ability of regions to prevent, deflect, or manage crises yields several 
suggestions for the design and construction of institutions in Asia. These fall under the 
headings below of (i) overall institutional strategy, (ii) substantive focus of cooperation, 
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(iii) balance between secretariats and intergovernmentalism, and (iv) membership and 
variable geometry. 
 
6.1.  Overall Institutional Strategy 
 
Our review of crises over the last 4 decades shows that they can provide a strong boost 
for regional institution building. But the magnitude of this boosting effect depends on 
prior circumstances, which are more favorable in some regions than others. One such 
circumstance is the existence of a regional secretariat and other institutions that provide 
a foundation on which to build. A fruitful strategy for advocates of Asian regionalism, 
therefore, would be to lay the institutional groundwork for integrative responses and then 
exploit it when crises open new possibilities for cooperation. By designing such 
institutions well, Asia could ratchet regional cooperation upward over successive 
iterations of crises, following the European pattern even while declining to adopt the 
European institutional form.  
 
6.2. Substantive  Agenda 
 
Regional cooperation should address the three related areas of surveillance, financial 
support, and balance of payments adjustment and exchange rate coordination. As this 
paper is being written, ASEAN+3 finance ministries are negotiating over implementation 
of the CMIM and creation of an independent secretariat to strengthen regional 
surveillance.
59 ASEAN+3 should follow through on this commitment, establish such a 
secretariat, delegate it clear responsibilities, and give it operational autonomy within a 
broad mandate to support regional integration. The objective should be to establish a 
robust surveillance mechanism that can identify vulnerabilities and needed policy 
adjustments, thereby supporting regional economic stability in general and providing a 
regional capacity to fashion policy conditionality when and if there are drawings on the 
CMIM.  
 
East Asia faces a well-known problem of collective action in balance of payments 
adjustment and currency appreciation. Although the recent crisis had placed this 
problem on the back burner, it is re-emerging as payments imbalances widen with 
recovery in the global economy. Rebalancing international payments requires expansion 
of domestic demand in Asian countries with current account surpluses. Several 
governments have tried to accomplish this with expansionary monetary policy—the 
domestic counterpart of foreign exchange intervention to depress the external value of 
the currency. The collective action problem arises from the fear that appreciation will 
place countries at a commercial disadvantage relative to their neighbors, with whom 
trade is largely competitive rather than complementary. The solution is to negotiate joint 
appreciation against the dollar, tighten domestic monetary policy, and continue to 
provide fiscal stimulus to domestic demand. Thus, in addition to strengthening 
surveillance and implementing the CMIM, Asian governments should engage in an 
intensive dialogue over macroeconomic and exchange rate policies, coordinate them 
accordingly, and thereby raise the standard of living of their citizens and contribute to 
global payments rebalancing. 
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6.3.  Delegation, Secretariats, and Intergovernmentalism 
 
Asia today faces the question of how to delegate important functions to common 
regional institutions. When implemented, the CMIM and strengthened surveillance could 
represent a fundamental shift toward common institutions which would be analogous to 
a shift from a free trade area to a customs union. ASEAN+3 members have had difficulty 
crossing this threshold together, however. Three impediments seemed to be operating 
against the creation of a secretariat: (i) strong national ministerial bureaucracies; (ii) 
intra-regional rivalry, especially between Japan and the PRC; and (iii) the presence of 
multilateral arrangements which, despite the region’s treatment during the 1997/98 
crisis, have recently been adapted to serve Asia better. Consider the ministerial 
bureaucracies, then several other implications for regional institutions below.   
 
The tradition of strong and autonomous ministerial bureaucracies in East Asia appears 
to have inhibited delegation to independent secretariats within the region—on trade, 
money and finance. Strong bureaucracies have arguably been one of the ingredients in 
the successful development model in East Asia. But, while some Asian government 
ministries have been internally cohesive and autonomous from the private sector, 
especially those in the three Northeast Asian countries, they have also tended to be 
autonomous from one another and the rest of the state apparatus. Bureaucratic 
autonomy has thus carried costs—in addition to the benefits—in the form of reduced 
communication and coordination among ministries and inter-ministerial competition.  
 
Given the competition among ministries that occurs within countries, we can expect 
them to resist establishing international bureaucracies (secretariats) and delegating real 
authority to them. Bureaucratic competition is especially problematic for delegation for 
regional cooperation, which is new and unexploited territory, where bureaucratic 
leadership and prerogatives have yet to be defined. Here the shadow of the future works 
against cooperation: ministries know that the institutional arrangements to which they 
agree could cement bureaucratic prerogatives in regional cooperation for decades into 
the future, with consequences for competition among ministries at the domestic and 
multilateral levels, and are therefore very cautious when entering into them.  
 
National ministries are therefore not likely sources of initiatives for delegation to 
independent secretariats. The intergovernmentalist model of European integration relied 
on periodic European Council meetings for such delegation. The Schmidt–Giscard 
episode suggests that the heads of government can serve this catalytic role, asserting 
the broader national interest in regional cooperation over the narrower concerns of 
ministerial bureaucracies. Summit decision-making in Europe also facilitated side 
payments.  Heads of government in Asia, meeting in regional summit meetings, should 
instead set the regional agenda, create new institutions, and delegate specific tasks to 
them and their secretariats.  
 
Summit-led regionalism does not exclude strong roles for national agencies and 
bureaucracies. Monetary integration in Europe developed through a strong network of 
relations among finance ministries and central banks meeting as Ecofin, the CCBG, and 
the Monetary Committee. Although the European Commission played an entrepreneurial 
role and participated in meetings, the relations among central banks and between them 36          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 81 
 
 
and the finance ministers were more important in charting the path to the introduction of 
the euro. Asian heads of government could sponsor the deepening of similar 
intergovernmental and central bank networks to support, for example, financial and 
monetary integration. 
 
Although key political decisions were taken at the most senior levels in Europe, the 
heads of government left the operation of the EMS and the technical preparations for the 
monetary union mostly to the central banks and finance ministries. Central banks had a 
considerable degree of autonomy—though not by any means complete autonomy—and 
that fact was essential to the maturation and acceptance of the EMS. Delegation to 
expert officials—whether to a joint secretariat or an intergovernmental group of central 
bank or finance ministry deputies—facilitates regionalism because they are more likely 
to configure regional arrangements on the basis of economic realities, whereas the 
senior political figures are more likely to risk conflict with the financial markets. Officials 
within the financial agencies can also sometimes agree with one another even when 
their leaders cannot. Foreign ministries and other agencies have little to contribute to the 
effective functioning of the CMIM, bilateral swap arrangements, and other monetary and 
financial initiatives in East Asia. Such matters should be left to the experts in these 
ministries and central banks to manage. 
 
The example of the EU also shows that national governments need not fear renegade, 
power-grabbing secretariats. The authority of the European Commission expanded only 
as conceded by the heads of state and government meeting in the European Council. 
Within its grants of authority, the Commission was entrepreneurial and could often 
exercise considerable discretion. But conflicts with member states, such as the 
celebrated standoffs with French President Charles de Gaulle in the mid-1960s and 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the early 1980s, occurred only in areas 
where member states had already created Community competence. The devolution of 
authority to Community institutions was not inexorable. Member states retained the 
authority to decide which matters would be transferred and refused to authorize such 
transfers in many important issue areas.
60 Asian governments can rest confident in their 
ability to hold regional secretariats to the remit that they collectively delegate to them.  
 
Within the institutional structure that managed monetary integration in Europe, the 
German Bundesbank and Finance Ministry were first among equals. They circumscribed 
the range of policy choices and simplified decisions within these bodies. In contrast to 
the influence and leadership of Germany in partnership with France that has been seen 
in Europe, we have tension between Japan and the PRC in Asia. This tension might not 
be an insurmountable barrier to the establishment of regional institutions, but it is a 
substantial barrier indeed. Were East Asian governments to delegate substantial 
authority to intergovernmental or representative bodies, and independent secretariats, 
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6.4.  Membership and Variable Geometry 
 
Asian regionalism is characterized by a complicated patchwork of overlapping and 
cross-cutting groupings of subregional, pan-regional, and cross-regional arrangements. 
Membership of new arrangements is debated at length, as are the relations between 
these arrangements and outside states. The European example demonstrates that 
variable geometry can succeed in fostering regional integration, but variable geometry in 
the form of concentric circles rather than haphazardly overlapping groups. Fortunately, a 
regional surveillance mechanism is well suited to a concentric circles approach. Once 
ASEAN+3 strengthens its surveillance mechanism, the group can construct a layered 
system upon it. ASEAN+3 would comprise the core, the next larger circle would 
incorporate the other members of the East Asia Summit meetings—Australia, New 
Zealand, and India—and the broadest grouping would include the remaining states. 
Information and analysis that is added with the expansion of the exercise to successively 
broader circles benefits the analysis of the economic situations of core countries. The 
group can also receive input, as it does now, from the IMF without surrendering control 
of the peer review process.
61 Consultations regarding exchange rates, macroeconomic 
policy, and balance of payments adjustment would also benefit from a wider scope and 
more openness. Regionalism in concentric circles can lay the basis for deepening and 
broadening institutions in the future as negotiated between the core and prospective 
members. 
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